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The Continuing Puzzle of Secured
Debt
Alan Schwartz*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1981, I wrote an article showing that no good answer had
been given to the question why corporations issue some debt on a
secured basis and other debt on an unsecured basis.' This showing
had normative implications because claims that the institution of
personal property security is efficient or otherwise desirable must
be impeached if the actual purposes that security serves are unknown. Consequently, the law's favorable treatment of secured
debt-for example, giving it first place in bankruptcy distributions-is without plausible support. My article did not advocate
repealing the privileges attached to secured debt, however, because
then-current knowledge also did not permit very precise predictions about repeal's effects. Rather, I claimed, the appropriate response to ignorance is enlightenment through research. This article
caused a stir among lawyers but, for reasons that will become clear,
not among economists. A generation of lawyers has been taught
* Maurice Jones, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center;

Professor of Law and Social Science, California Institute of Technology. B.S. 1961, Bates
College; LL.B. 1964, Yale University. The editors of the Vanderbilt Law Review kindly
asked me to respond to an article they recently had published on this subject by Professor
James J. White. I took the invitation as an opportunity to review the question generally.
This Article benefited substantially from conversations with Jennifer Reinganum and
Louis Wilde. Richard Craswell, Thomas Jackson, Stephen Morse, Matthew Spitzer, and
James Strnad made helpful comments on prior drafts.
1.

Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities:A Review of Current TheLEGAL STUD. 1 (1981).

ories, 10 J.

1051

1052

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1051

that security is a good thing. Professor Saul Levmore2 and Professor James Whites produced ambitious efforts to support this belief
since I wrote. This Article shows that both efforts are unsuccessful.
Part II begins by discussing the Modigliani/Miller ("MM")
hypothesis that was intellectual background to my initial article.
Part III shows that Professor Levmore's defense of security is unpersuasive under either of its two plausible interpretations: under
one interpretation, the phenomena to which he advances security
as a response can exist only by happenstance, not systematically;
and under the second interpretation, it is impossible to make
claims about the purposes of security because it is impossible to
know how markets would function in its absence. Part IV shows
that Professor White's two efforts at explaining and justifying personal property security fail because they are theoretically incomplete and generate predictions that the facts contradict. Part V
briefly discusses current responses to the issues that the MM hypothesis posed, in the hope of suggesting where answers to the secured debt puzzle might be found.

II.

THE

MM

HYPOTHESIS AND THE SECURED DEBT PUZZLE

Before 1958, finance economists thought that a corporation
could increase its value in two ways-by increasing its income
(without taking undue risks) and by issuing the correct mix of debt
and equity securities. Therefore, the accepted wisdom was that
corporate managers who wanted to maximize profits had the two
distinct tasks of choosing appropriate projects for their firms and
selecting "optimal capital structures." The MM hypothesis, the
first version of which was published in 1958, 4 holds that under certain assumptions there is only one task to perform-to choose appropriate projects. A corporation, Modigliani and Miller proved,
could not increase its value by altering its capital structure; firm
value is solely a function of the size and risk of the firm's income
stream. Consequently, the MM hypothesis concludes that no optimal capital structure exists; any particular structure is as good as
2.

See Levmore, Monitors and Freeridersin Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92

YALE L.J. 49 (1982).

3. See White, Efficiency Justificationsfor Personal Property Security, 37 VAND. L.
REv. 473 (1984).
4. See Modigliani & Miller, The Cost of Capital, CorporationFinance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. Rv. 261 (1958); see also Stiglitz, On the Irrelevance of
CorporateFinancialPolicy, 64 AM. ECON. Rav. 851 (1974) (deriving the MM hypothesis in a
formal way).
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any other.
The logic underlying the MM hypothesis is simple. A corporation could increase its value by altering its capital structure only if
investors valued particular capital structures and so were willing to
pay premiums to firms for adopting them. For example, if investors value shares of stock in Firm X not only because those shares
represent claims on Firm X's earnings but also because they reflect
ownership in the particular corporate form that Firm X has
adopted, then the sum the investors would pay for a share of Firm
X's stock would be a function both of X's earnings and of this
form. Under the MM assumptions, investors place a value of zero
on any particular corporate form and so will pay no premium to
hold shares reflecting it. Consequently, no firm can increase its
value by altering its capital structure. To get the flavor of the MM
hypothesis, suppose that an investor wants to hold a leveraged
portfolio; that is, she wants to hold both equity and debt. The investor can achieve this goal by buying stock in a leveraged firm,
one that has issued both equity (stock) and debt (bonds). But the
investor also can achieve a leveraged portfolio by borrowing money
and using the borrowed funds as well as her own to buy stock in an
unleveraged firm. The investor then will hold debt in the form of a
bank loan and equity in the form of the stock she purchased. Since
our investor can make her own leverage, she will not pay a firm to
create leverage for her. Thus, the leveraged firm's value cannot be
increased above the value it would have had were it all equity
financed. In the world of the MM hypothesis, investors can hold
unleveraged portfolios, by holding stock only in all equity firms, or
they can hold any portion and quality of debt they want by appropriate lending-buying a firm's bonds-or borrowing.
The assumptions that generated the MM result varied in their
realism. The MM proof assumed perfect capital markets, which
meant that individual investors can borrow and lend on the same
terms as firms could. Modigliani and Miller also assumed that all
debt is riskless-equivalently, that bankruptcy costs are zero-and
that no taxes exist. The first assumption, many believe, is not far
wrong5 but the last two are plainly false. Modigliani and Miller of
course knew this. And they also knew that firms act as if capital
structure matters; corporate managers issue a great variety of se5. See, e.g., R. BREALEy & S. MyERS, PmNciPLs op CORPoRATE FINANCE 368-69 (2d ed.
1984) (interest rates on home mortgages approximate rates on high-grade corporate bonds;
rates on individual investors' margin debt with brokers approximate rates on short-term
bank loans).
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curities, which they would be unlikely to do if these securities did
not affect firm value. Rather, Modigliani and Miller adopted their
assumptions for heuristic purposes. In an "ideal world," capital
structure does not matter. The analyst's task is to relax the assumptions selectively; for example, to assume that bankruptcy
costs are positive but that the other assumptions hold, and then to
ask whether this new model explains what actually is observed. If
it does, then, following our example, bankruptcy costs would be
the key to capital structure. If not, then the analyst can try something else. Finance economists have played this game since 1958
and have made progress, but they are still far from a solution to
the MM problem. No rigorous, generally accepted explanation of
the optimal capital structure exists.
My article was written against this intellectual background. If
no one knew why firms issue debt rather than equity, or why they
issue preferred rather than common stock, it was unlikely that everyone knew why firms issue secured rather than unsecured debt,
or why markets generate the mixture of secured and unsecured
debt that is observed. Consequently, I made a series of assumptions much like those of MM and proved that firms cannot increase their value by issuing one form of debt rather than another.
If they cannot, security should not be seen because security is
costly for firms to issue; firms will not incur costs that are unmatched by corresponding gains. The logic of my proof also was
simple. Secured creditors will charge lower interest rates because
security reduces their risks, but unsecured creditors will raise their
interest rates in response because security reduces the assets on
which they can levy, and so increases their risks. The interest rate
reductions are precisely matched by interest rate increases; hence,
the firm makes no net gain from granting security. In the terms of
the MM hypothesis, a lender can control the riskiness of her loan
portfolio either by controlling the rates she will charge or by lending to firms with particular debt patterns. For obvious reasons, the
conclusions I drew from this fact were unsurprising to economists;
in effect, the economists already knew.'
The assumptions that underlay my proof also were unrealistic
and I knew that much secured debt exists, but I was playing the
same game as Modigliani and Miller. Much of my article consisted
6. For example, Brealey and Myers state that MM reached "an extremely general result. It applies not just to the debt-equity trade-off but to any choice of financing instrument. For example, MM would say that the choice between long-term and short-term debt
has no effect on firm value." Id. at 372 (emphasis in original).
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in relaxing the assumptions on which my proof rested or
additional factors, to see whether a convincing explanation
present pattern of secured lending would emerge. None did.
not to say that none will but, as the next two parts of this
show, none yet has.
III.
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PROFESSOR LEVMORE'S THEORY

Professor Saul Levmore explains the existence of security by
reference to the phenomena of monitoring and freeriding." To understand these phenomena, one must consider a particular form of
strategic behavior: the retroactive reduction of interest rates. The
interest rate a lender will charge is partly a function of the riskiness of a firm's projects. Therefore, a firm has an incentive to borrow at a particular rate and, after this rate is "locked in," to adopt
riskier projects than previously. Limited liability explains this conduct: the firm's shareholders will capture the entire upside from
the gamble but lose only the share price if the gamble fails. Creditors are aware that firms may engage in such strategic behavior
and so might monitor-that is, watch-firms to prevent its occurrence. Alternatively, creditors will not monitor but will charge
higher interest rates to compensate for the risk.
A firm might engage in this form of strategic behavior by making "asset substitutions." As an example, suppose a firm that once
produced cotton cloth using one set of machines and, after borrowing money, switched to making transparent plastic suits using another set of machines. Creditors monitor particular assets, according to Levmore, to prevent such asset substitutions.
Levmore posits a world in which there exists one debtor, D,
and two creditors, C1 and C2. Both creditors may monitor specific
assets to prevent the debtor from converting them or substituting
other assets for them. This duplicate effort is disadvantageous to D
since his interest cost is partly a function of his creditors' monitoring costs, and these costs are unnecessarily high. Alternatively,
neither creditor will monitor but both will charge high interest
rates. The ideal solution, Levmore argues, is for D to have only one
creditor monitor the particular assets. Then, if both previously had
monitored, D's costs will decline. Or if neither monitored but one
creditor now monitors, the other will freeride on its efforts and will
charge lower rates. The best way for D to have only one creditor
monitor is by giving it a security interest in D's assets; this creditor
7. See Levmore, supra note 2, at 50-59.
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then will monitor these assets, and no other creditor would have an
incentive to monitor them because they are no longer available to
satisfy judgments. Levmore claims that D will secure the most efficient monitor because doing so minimizes D's net credit costs.
Therefore, security exists because it is efficient.
Levmore's theory is difficult to evaluate because it is imprecise
about the functions that monitoring serves and about how creditors actually do it. Under the most plausible interpretation of his
argument, his conclusions cannot hold. Under a somewhat less
plausible interpretation, it is simply impossible to say what firms
in his world would do without security, and thus impossible for
Levmore to show that security functions as an optimal response. If
Levmore's argument permits interpretations other than these two,
it is for him to say. Respecting the first plausible interpretation,
Levmore could be saying that monitoring by one creditor frequently is sufficient to prevent asset substitution. Concretely, it
takes only one monitor to prevent D from selling his cotton manufacturing machines." Then, if both C1 and C2 monitor, there is duplicate effort. Since Levmore explains security partly as a response
to duplicate effort, 9 he apparently believes that, at least in many
cases, one monitor is sufficient. If he does believe this, however, his
explanation must fail because duplicate monitoring efforts rarely
would occur in a world without security.
When one creditor's monitoring efforts alone would prevent
asset substitution, only two equilibria are possible: one in which
only one creditor monitors and the other in which none do. 10 The
former outcome would be an equilibrium if at least one creditor in
8. Levmore states:
Consider again the need for C1 to be wary of debtor misbehavior. Why should C1 expend resources attempting to discover such misbehavior? C2 is also affected by such
misbehavior and Cl may well expect C2 to monitor the debtor. Similarly C2 may anticipate that Cl will perform the necessary monitoring.
Id. at 53-54. This seemingly implies that monitoring by only one of these creditors would
prevent asset substitution.
9. Id.
10. The text refers to a Nash equilibrium, which is the most commonly used equilibrium concept in economics. The concept supposes each actor in an economic environment to
pursue a specified strategy designed to achieve a particular objective, such as to minimize
costs. A set of strategies is in a Nash equilibrium when no actor has an incentive to alter his
or her strategy, given that the other actors continue to pursue their strategies. Because no
one has an incentive to alter course, an environment described by such a Nash equilibrium
set of strategies is stable. Conversely, when at least one actor has an incentive to alter his or
her strategy, given that the other actors pursue their strategies unchanged, the resulting
outcome is unstable; the particular environment is not in equilibrium. See R. LucE & M.
RAIFFA, GAwds

mD

DEClSIONS 170-79 (1957).
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the market could prevent the debtor from disposing of his cotton
machines at a cost to the creditor that is less than the gain the
creditor would realize from ensuring that the debtor retained the
machines. To see why, suppose: (i) security does not exist; (ii) several creditors can cost justifiedly monitor a particular debtor; and
(iii) all of these creditors begin to monitor. Each creditor would be
better off if it ceased to monitor, given that the other creditors
continued to monitor. Levmore's assumption that one monitor is
sufficient implies that a creditor who stops can obtain the full benefits from monitoring without incurring any of the costs. Any creditor to whom this obvious thought occurred would stop. The "stopping process" would end when only one creditor monitored, for
this outcome is an equilibrium: a single creditor's monitoring efforts will vitiate the incentive of other creditors to monitor, yet the
remaining monitor itself has no incentive to stop because, ex hypothesis, it is earning gains in the form of risk reduction that exceed its monitoring costs. To say that only one monitor can exist in
equilibrium is to say that any other outcome is unstable. There
could be several monitors for a time but the superfluous ones have
incentives to stop; and there could be no monitors for a time, but
then at least one creditor has an incentive to start.
Levmore argued that security is partly a response to duplicate
monitoring. That only one monitor can exist in equilibrium, when
monitoring by a single creditor would prevent asset substitution, is
fatal to this argument. Put simply, the stable, pervasive existence
of personal property security is quite unlikely to be a response to
the disequilibrium phenomenon of duplicate monitoring.
Levmore's second argument is that debtors issue security
when no one is monitoring them, to induce one creditor to begin.
This argument too must fall. An equilibrium in which no one
monitors can exist only if no creditor is a cost-justified monitor. In
this circumstance, no creditor has an incentive to begin monitoring, though no one else monitors. If one such creditor is given security, it would not begin to monitor because, Levmore assumes,
security does not affect the risk of asset substitutions; monitoring
does.11 If monitoring was not cost justified in the absence of secur11. Levmore's assumption that only monitoring reduces the risk of asset substitution
is questionable since security seemingly substitutes for monitoring; the public notice that
accompanies a security interest is partly meant to prevent the debtor from selling encumbered assets, and so reduces the secured creditor's need to monitor. Levmore, however, cannot assume that creditors with security monitor less than those without it because this assumption would contradict his conclusion that debtors secure the most efficient monitors: if
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ity, it then could not become cost justified with it. Therefore, debtors never 12would give security to induce monitoring when no one
monitors.

Levmore instead might believe that one creditor's monitoring
efforts would be insufficient to prevent asset substitution, though
little in his language is consistent with this interpretation. Respecting this possible second interpretation of his argument, let
the gain to a particular creditor from a reduction in the risk of
asset substitution be such that, given the creditor's monitoring
costs, monitoring the debtor only two hours a day is optimal. Then
the risk of asset substitution can be eliminated only if several creditors monitor. There are three things to say about this interpretation of Levmore. First, if the debtor were to give security in this
situation, that security might not be a response to duplicate monitoring efforts; all of these efforts actually could have been necessary. Second, if several creditors would monitor the debtor without
security, then securing one of them seemingly could cause the
others to stop only if the secured party lent a sum at least equal to
the full value of the debtor's assets. To see why, suppose that D
secured creditors were to monitor less than unsecured creditors, then the cost-minimizing
debtor strategy would be to secure the least efficient monitor so that the debtor would be
monitored as inexpensively as possible. See Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financingand
Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1157-58 (1979) (arguing that differential
monitoring costs among creditors may provide an explanation for the existence of security).
12. This note formally demonstrates the text's conclusion and need be read only by
those to whom that conclusion is not self-evident. Let P = default premium-that portion
of the interest rate reflecting the risk of default-when a creditor is unsecured; Ps = default
premium with security; L = amount of the loan that a creditor will lose on default; A debtor's total assets if it does not engage in asset substitution; A' = assets the debtor might
substitute for A; p = probability that the debtor will default if it does not engage in asset
substitution; p' = default probability if the debtor does substitute, where p'>p; b = portion of the debtor's assets that a creditor could reach on default or, in other words, the ratio
of a creditor's loan to the debtor's total debt outstanding; e = probability that the debtor
will engage in asset substitution; and M = monitoring cost. Then, without security, P = p(l
- e)(L - (b)A) + p' (e)(L - (b)A'). Let e = 0 and call the resultant default premium >. Then
P = p(L - (b)A). The increment of the default premium attributable to asset substitution is
then P - P', and no creditor will monitor in the absence of security when P - P<M. For
security to produce monitoring given this cost comparison, it must be that Ps - P>M or
Ps>Pby the requisite amount. Suppose that A>2;L but A'<XL and let a creditor take
security. Then compare: (i) no security: P = p(1 - e)(L - (b)A) + p'(e)(L - (b)A'); (ii) with
security: Ps = p(1 - e)(L - L) + p*(e)(L - (b)A'). Hence, it must be that Ps<P,which also is
intuitively plausible since security supposedly is taken to reduce risk. And if P>Ps,then P P'>Ps- P. Therefore, when P - P'<M,it must be that Ps - P <M also; thus, security
cannot induce monitoring. In words, security only can reduce the default premium creditors
will exact or leave this premium unchanged if security itself does not influence the risk of
asset substitution. Consequently, if monitoring is not cost justified without security, it cannot be cost justified with security.
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satisfied one-third of its credit needs from Firm X and gave Firm
X a security interest in all of its assets, which are worth three
times the amount of Firm X's loan. Firm X could reach only onethird of the value of these assets on default. Since the other creditors could levy on the remaining two-thirds, and since, by hypothesis, the first creditor's monitoring efforts alone are insufficient to
prevent asset substitution, the other creditors would have no incentive to stop monitoring. If Firm X, however, lent a sum equal to
the full value of D's assets and was secured fully, no other creditor
would have an incentive to monitor D because no other creditor
could reach D's assets. Therefore, the alternative interpretation of
Levmore's argument may predict that debtors always will secure
all of their debt until they run out of assets to offer-a prediction
the facts disconfirm.
The final point that should be considered regarding the alternative interpretation of Levmore's theory is that it actually is difficult to know how many creditors would monitor if one creditor's
monitoring alone would not suffice. The creditors might play a cooperative game, in which they share monitoring responsibility."3
They might play a noncooperative game in which, as examples,
each creditor might decide to monitor or not independently of
what any other creditor might do; each creditor might bluff, saying
that it will not monitor at all in the hope that others then would;
or each might decide to monitor with a particular probability. In
this last case, one cannot characterize market behavior without
specifying the factors that cause creditors to choose particular
monitoring probabilities. Predicting what will occur when the efforts of several creditors are necessary to prevent asset substitution, and when both coordination and conflict among creditors are
possible, requires a great deal more work than Levmore has done.
The analyst must make a set of probably highly context-specific
assumptions about what each of the creditors knows about the
debtor and the other creditors, and about what strategies the creditors will play; the analyst then must characterize the equilibria
that might exist. Until Levmore does this for a variety of possible
cases, he is unpersuasive; we cannot know to what phenomena security responds unless we know what phenomena are at least likely
to exist.
13. Levmore apparently believes that cooperative monitoring never would occur but
he does not justify this belief formally. See Levmore, supra note 2, at 54-55.
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PROFESSOR WHITE'S THEORIES

Professor White offers two explanations for the existence and
efficiency of secured debt. The first claims that unsecured creditors
will not raise their interest rates in response to security. Because
secured creditors lower their rates, security is a net gain to the
firm. 14 The second explanation claims that security is issued in re-

sponse to creditor risk aversion; since risk aversion leads to inefficient outcomes, security is efficient. 15 Neither explanation is satisfactory. The first, like one interpretation of the Levmore theory,
actually predicts that firms will secure all of their debt until they
run out of assets. The second explanation predicts that banks will
secure a greater percentage of their loans than will finance companies, but the opposite pattern of secured lending apparently exists.
Thus the facts refute Professor White's interesting effort.
A.

The Interest Rate Argument

The existence of secured debt is puzzling because the interest
rate reductions of the secured creditors seemingly are offset by the
interest rate increases of unsecured creditors. This latter group will
raise their rates because the withdrawal of assets from the previously available asset pool increases the riskiness of their loans.
White argues that secured creditors attach assets that actually are
not available to the unsecured creditors. In consequence, the unsecured creditors will not raise their rates in response to security;
since they never could reach the assets now devoted to the secured
creditor, security cannot influence the risks they face. White traces
the inability of unsecured creditors to reach their debtors' assets to
recent changes in state law and to the new Bankruptcy Code. Respecting consumers, liberalized exemption laws allow debtors to
keep so much property that "the unsecured creditor will be indifferent to the presence of secured claims on the debtors' assets."'"
Respecting firms, the very common practice of many bankrupt
concerns to dissipate their assets in futile attempts at reorganization ensures that often "a rational prepetition unsecured creditor
14. White, supra note 3, at 480-89.
15. Id. at 491-502. White also suggests that the efficiency of security can be inferred
from its existence: "One might ask why it has persisted in a free economy for so long if it is
not efficient." Id. at 479. This suggestion is incorrect; the existence of security shows only
that the private gain to at least some parties associated with its use exceeds the private cost
to those parties, but the issue is whether the social gain exceeds the social cost. For example,
monopoly power and cartels are pervasive features of free economies but are not efficient.
16. Id. at 487.
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will be indifferent to others' taking of security. 17
An initial difficulty with the argument that secured creditors
attach assets unavailable to other creditors is that the pattern of
secured lending seems not to have changed materially in the last
two decades although many of the legal changes on which White
relies have been adopted recently. This is particularly true of
changes in bankruptcy law. If the present pattern of secured lending antedated these legal changes, the changes cannot be used to
explain this pattern. White's argument would be persuasive only if
he correlated changes in the law with changes in business practice,
but he apparently cannot do so.
Further, White's argument is contradicted by the facts in another way. He seemingly supposes debtors to hold assets that creditors cannot reach in the event of bankruptcy unless the creditors
are secured. Were this assumption true, secured loans would be
less risky than unsecured loans, so the latter necessarily would
carry higher interest rates. But if creditors cannot reach assets unless they have security and if unsecured loans are made at higher
interest rates, debtors always would borrow on a secured basis until they ran out of free assets. A numerical example will illustrate:
let X be the premium that creditors charge to compensate for the
risk of default; let p = the probability of default; let L be the
amount of a loan that a creditor would lose on default; and let A =
the debtor's assets. With White, I assume that without security no
creditor could reach the assets; A is out of bounds. Thus, X = pL;
on default, the creditor loses the amount of the loan. To make
matters simple, assume one debtor, D, and two creditors, C1 and
C2. Each will lend $100; A = $100; and p = .02.
There are three cases to consider. First, neither creditor is secured. Then X1 = .02 x $100 = $2; X2 = .02 x $100 = $2; and
the debtor's total default premium-the amount that the creditors
charge him for the risk they face-is X1 + X2 = $4. Second, let
the debtor give two security interests, each in assets worth $50,
with C1 getting one and C2 the other. Then for each creditor, X =
p(L-A12), since on default the creditor can foreclose and collect
one-half of D's assets. Therefore, X1 = .02 ($100 - $50) = $1; X2
= .02 ($100 - $50) = $1; and the total default premium is X1 +
X2 = $2. Security reduces the debtor's interest charges by $2.
Third, let the debtor secure only C1 for $50. Then X1 = .02 ($100
- $50) = $1; X2 = .02 ($100) = $2; and the debtor's total default
17. Id. at 489.

1062

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1051

premium is X1 + X2 = $3. This third case should not occur, however, because it is irrational of the debtor not to secure C2 also; by
not doing so the debtor incurs an extra interest charge of $1 with
no corresponding gain. Hence, debtors in White's world will issue
only secured debt until they run out of assets to offer. Neither consumers nor firms consistently act in this way, so the facts disconfirm White's theory."8
B. Risk Aversion
Professor White's risk aversion theory has two aspects. The
first assumes that employees, particularly bank lending officers, are
risk averse and so will cause their firms not to make profit maximizing loans. The second aspect assumes that differential risk
aversion exists among firms in credit markets.
1. Employee Risk Aversion
Investors have three concerns: the timing of returns, the risk
of returns, and the size of returns. An investor can achieve her preferred pattern of timing and risk by choosing an appropriate investment portfolio. Returns can be deferred by buying long term
bonds, accelerated by buying T-bills; risks can be increased by
purchasing shares in risky firms, decreased by holding riskless assets. Hence, an investor wants each firm in which she invests only
to maximize the value of her investment in it."9 This desire is premise to the conclusion that corporate managers ought to maximize
share values.
Corporate managers who maximize share values will not act as
if they are risk averse, for risk aversion follows from the diminishing marginal utility of money theory. This theory does not describe
the behavior of a person who seeks to maximize share values. Such
a person considers each new dollar of increase in value to be as
important as each previous dollar of increase, and thus wants only
18. For those who read note 12, the text's numerical example generalizes straightforwardly. When the creditor cannot reach the debtor's assets without security, P = p(L).
When the creditor can reach them with security, Ps = p(L - L) if A>ZL or, as in the text's
example, Ps = p(L - (b)A) if A<ZL. Because in both cases Ps is less than P, a debtor who
wished to minimize credit costs would secure all of its assets; by doing so it would minimize
its total default premium.
19. Investors are sometimes said to want their companies to act in socially useful ways
at the expense of profits, but this possibility is irrelevant to the analysis here in that White's
argument and my criticism of it are unaffected if the goal "maximize investment value subject to a social responsibility constraint" is substituted for the goal "maximize investment
value."
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to maximize expected monetary returns; the person, that is, is risk
neutral. Therefore, if corporate managers should maximize share
values, then they should act in a risk neutral manner. A risk averse
employee will refuse credit or offer less credit than would a risk
neutral employee acting in the same circumstances. According to
White, security partly ameliorates the effects of such employee risk
aversion. Lending officers will make some profitable loans or make
larger profitable loans on a secured basis than they would make
without security; hence, security brings the volume of credit closer
to the efficient level.
This argument is interesting but incomplete. As we will see,
security cannot altogether cure the inefficiencies attributable to
employee risk aversion. Thus, companies have incentives to cause
employees to act in a risk neutral fashion even though the employees can make secured loans. The existence of these incentives
raises two difficulties for White's argument. First, suppose that
banks already have acted on their incentives to eliminate employee
risk aversion. Since security still exists, White's argument that it is
a response to employee risk aversion then must fail. Second, suppose that banks have not acted on these incentives. Then, White
must explain why they have not, but this he has failed to do.
To better understand these two difficulties, it is useful to begin with the inefficiencies of risk aversion in the presence of security. A risk averse lending officer might demand more security than
is necessary in the circumstances or might attempt to exact a
higher interest rate than is necessary given that security exists. Either action will cause potential borrowers to forego credit altogether, to take less of it, or to request payment terms or other contract clauses that compensate them for the lending officers'
unwarranted demands. Any of these actions will reduce a bank's
profits. Corporate managers whose goal is to maximize profits thus
have incentives to cause lending officers to act as if they were risk
neutral, even though security exists.
Achieving employee risk neutrality is possible on White's assumptions. He does not advance facts that directly evidence employee risk aversion but rather infers its existence from an alleged
asymmetry in bank employees' reward structures. He argues that
the costs to employees if their loan portfolios perform badly-in
terms of lost jobs, foregone promotions, or lower salaries
-outweigh the gains to them if their loan portfolios do well. If the
employee risk aversion problem is traceable to an asymmetry in
reward structures, however, it seemingly can be cured by eliminat-
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ing the asymmetry: employees can be rewarded more highly for
successful performance and punished less severely for unsuccessful
performance that is not the result of their own incompetence.
For White's argument to hold, then, he must show why senior
corporate managers permit inefficient, seemingly easily changed reward structures to persist. One possible explanation for such behavior is that the senior managers themselves do not maximize
profits. But these managers often are given stock options or warrants to induce them to behave as the shareholders would wish,
and the shareholders prefer profit maximization. Why won't the
ownership position of the senior managers cause them to alter the
lending officers' reward structure to eliminate risk aversion? Why
won't the senior managers' concern for their own reputations as
successful business people induce them not to permit inefficient
compensation strategies? Why won't the directors make senior
management act efficiently in this regard? Why won't the shareholders, many of whom are knowledgeable pension funds and insurance companies, exert pressure on the directors? Why won't
firms take over inefficient banks or, using different incentive structures, otherwise enter credit markets to take business away from
banks that are plagued by inefficient employee risk aversion?
White's theory of security as a response to employee risk aversion is unsatisfactory, as these questions imply, because such risk
aversion cannot exist if credit, capital, or managerial service markets function properly. 20 Hence, White's argument actually must
rest on the existence of market imperfections that he neither discloses nor describes. Indeed, White's own authorities suggest that
his argument actually faces the first difficulty noted above: competitive market pressures have caused at least some banks to alter
employee reward structures to the point at which employee risk
taking rather than risk aversion is the real problem. One such article,21 written by a bank vice president, advanced the novel idea
that a bank could increase profits by giving lending officers
20. Respecting the managerial services market, corporate managers have a strong incentive to maximize the profits of the companies or company divisions that they manage
because a record of profit maximization is the best way to ensure the manager's own marketability. See Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288,
291-92 (1980). The recent tendency of top management to partition their companies into
"profit centers" should broaden the employee universe over which this incentive operates.
For a description of the tendency to use profit centers, see Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1224-25 (1984).
21. Roberts, Increasing Bank Profitability by Modifying Loan Officer Performance,
65 J. CoM. BANK LENDING 2 (Feb. 1983).
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financial incentives to expand output. The author then added:
The most common response to evaluation and incentive systems of this
kind is the-expression of fear that an officer will load up the portfolio with
excessively risky loans ...
In order to continue addressing the risk question, our bank chooses to
charge each loss to the proper officer's profit center report. This double pen22
alty is simply an arbitrary decision to accommodate the high-risk question.

To summarize, firms already may have altered their reward
structures to eliminate the cause of risk aversion, in which case
White has no explanation for the pattern of secured lending that
now exists. Alternatively, firms do not respond to risk aversion.
But an analyst who takes this position must explain why inefficient
compensation packages for nonunionized middle-level employees
persist. White neither has proven that employee risk aversion is
now frequent nor has explained how it could be frequent. Until he
accomplishes at least one of these tasks, his analysis is unpersuasive.
2. Firm Risk Aversion
My earlier article showed that if creditors differed in their degree of risk aversion, it was possible, at least in theory, for a debtor
to reduce its net credit costs by securing its most risk averse creditors.2 3 White argues that regulatory constraints cause banks to be

more risk averse than finance companies and other potential lenders. He then concludes that security is a response to differential
risk aversion. This conclusion might be persuasive were banks to
hold a higher portion of their debt secured than other creditors, for
then debtors seemingly would be securing their most risk averse
creditors. Unfortunately for White's theory, most people believe
that banks hold a lower portion of their debt secured than finance
22. Id. at 11 (emphasis added). White also cites F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
White, supra note 3, at 493 n.41.
Scherer, however, concludes: "All in all, the weight of evidence favors a conclusion that
profitability does have a significant positive impact on managers' pay." F. SCHERER, supra,
at 36. Scherer adds that senior management commonly hold equity or the right to buy equity on favorable terms, which biases them in favor of profit maximization. See id. Rigorous
support for Scherer's view is found in Ciscel & Carroll, The Determinants of Executive
Salaries: An Econometric Survey, 62 Rzv. ECON. & STATISTICS 7, 12 (1980) (results provide
"a strong vindication of the neoclassical model of management behavior .... [W]e can
confidently reject the null hypothesis that increasing the firm's profits by means other than
increasing sales (e.g., by reducing production costs) does not increase executive rewards.").
23. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 22-24.
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMC PERFORMANCE (2d ed. 1980). See
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companies do.24 Supposing this to be so, White's explanation of security as a response to differential risk aversion among creditors
must be rejected unless he can show that banks lend to the least
risky pool of debtors and that, holding debtor risk constant, debtors prefer to give security to banks rather than to their other creditors. White has made neither showing.
V.

THE MM HYPOTHESIS REvISITED:

SOURCES OF

POSSIBLE

EXPLANATION

A central problem with Professor Levmore's and Professor
White's efforts is their failure to address in detail the question why
a variety of debt instruments is seen. This failure apparently is the
source of the penchant of many current efforts, including those
discussed here, to predict either that firms always or never will issue secured debt, when in fact firms seldom act in such all or nothing ways. Finance economists have begun to address the "variety"
question by focusing on the existence of taxes and bankruptcy
costs.
Interest payments are deductible to firms but income paid out
as dividends or retained is not. Hence, the existence of the corporate tax should bias firms toward issuing debt, other things equal.
The ability of firms to benefit from the interest deduction, however, varies. Firms incurring or expecting losses have little use for
it. Also, firms differ in the ways available to them to minimize
taxes; for example, some may use the investment tax credit while
others, who sell largely services, are unable to avoid taxes in this
way and so may have a greater need for the interest deduction that
debt provides. In addition, investors are in different tax brackets.
Corporations pay relatively little tax on dividends they receive, the
income of pension funds is tax exempt, and high-bracket taxpayers
may dislike corporate debt because they must pay ordinary income
tax on it. Rather, high-bracket taxpayers may prefer equity, for if
firms retain dividends these taxpayers can cash out many investments at capital gain rates. This heterogeneity in the preferences
of firms and investors for debt may supply an explanation of the
optimal capital structure for particular firms or markets as a
24.

White's footnotes also evidence the belief that finance companies secure a greater

portion of their loans than banks do. Note 59 of White's article begins by claiming that
"[r]eceivables and inventory typically secure" commercial finance company loans, and the
note later quotes a Wall Street Journal story which explains that banks have less expertise
in secured lending than finance companies do. These authorities seemingly imply that banks
are secured less frequently than finance companies are.
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whole.
Explanations in this vein are unlikely to be relevant to the secured debt puzzle. Analysts to date have shown that tax related
capital market equilibria can occur only under fairly unrealistic
conditions. In addition, the tax models tend to predict equilibria in
which investors hold only debt or equity, not both; the variety of
securities in the portfolios of many investors is an embarrassment
to the theory. Also, in the equilibria that these models derive, no
optimal capital structure for a particular firm exists; rather, firms
are indifferent to their capital structures, but the entire corporate
sector has a debt/equity ratio equal to the ratio of the wealth of
those investors who prefer debt to the wealth of those who prefer
equity.25 Finally, the interest on secured and unsecured debt is
equally deductible to firms and is equally ordinary income to
debtholders. Hence, an explanation for the existence of security
probably will not be found in theories that make taxes a significant
variable.
The likelihood of firms to incur bankruptcy costs-i.e., to experience financial distress-rises with the amount of debt in their
capital structures; simply, the more a firm borrows the more likely
it is to default, other things equal. Thus, the expected costs of
financial distress constrain the amount of debt firms will find it
optimal to assume. Also, the more risky a firm is, the more likely it
is to fail. Since the costs of financial distress rise with the amount
of debt that a firm issues, scholars have predicted that high risk
firms will issue less debt than low risk firms, but the facts do not
strongly support the predictions.26 These financial distress models
ultimately may contribute to understanding the secured debt puzzle, but understanding seems far away. One intuitive reason for the
lack of help these models give is that the presence of security
seems to correlate positively with risk, yet the presence of risk, at
least in theory, seems to correlate negatively with debt; and security cannot be taken if no debt exists.
A promising heuristic that these recent analyses of the MM
25. A good recent article that reviews the literature and evidences these difficulties is
Auerbach & King, Taxation, Portfolio Choice, and Debt-Equity Ratios: A General Equilibrium Model, 98 Q.J. EcoN. 587, 589-601 (1983). Respecting unrealistic conditions, this set of
models proves that a "tax equilibrium" can occur only when all debL is riskiess, short sales
are prohibited, and a single firm exists whose underlying returns are perfectly correlated
with the returns of some linear combination of the returns of other firms.
26. See, e.g., Castanias, Bankruptcy Risk and Optimal Capital Structure, 38 J. FiN.
1617 (1983) (reviews literature, finding only weak support for the hypothesis that high risk
firms will issue less debt than will low risk firms, and then only if the firms are small).
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problem suggest, however, is to ask why some debtors find security
less costly than other debtors do, and why some investors/lenders
want it more than others do. Inquiries should focus directly on the
possibility of differential preferences among debtors and creditors
regarding security. Professor White's effort to characterize the
preferences of banks in contrast to the preferences of other creditors thus is wise, though he failed to develop this focus into a
model. Another possibility is to focus on the differing characteristics of debtors. Retailers that borrow, for example, seemingly are
secured more frequently than manufacturers that borrow. Perhaps
this is because a relatively large portion of the personalty capital of
manufacturers has attributes that are firm specific, and thus this
capital has greater value to the firm than to the market. For example, Firm X's machines are useful primarily to Firm X and so are
worth little on the market; creditors thus may not want security in
them. In contrast, the bulk of a retailer's assets consist of inventory and accounts receivable, which are worth as much to the market as to the firm. Consequently, retailers should issue more debt
secured by personalty than should manufacturers. This Article's
task is not to develop such a theory, but rather to suggest that
answers to the secured debt puzzle are less likely to be found in
simple notions that "security interests reduce risk" than in careful
analyses of the differing preferences for security among debtors
and creditors.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The secured debt puzzle remains: firms issue much debt on a
secured basis, yet the causes and effects of this practice are largely
unknown. The normative implications of this ignorance are a separate question. Professor White argues that security should not be
banned because creditors will substitute more costly ways to
achieve the objectives that security now serves. This argument is
correct but beside the point. No one has argued, at least not in the
last three decades, that security should be banned. The issue concerns the priority position of secured debt in the event of default,
and this issue usually entails clashes between equity and efficiency
goals. For example, it is one thing to say that employee claims
should come behind secured creditor claims in bankruptcy if it is
known that security as an institution creates important efficiency
gains for the economy as a whole. It is another thing to argue for
27.

See White, supra note 3, at 502-08.
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this position on the ground that although security itself may be a
bad thing, secured lending will become marginally more costly if
poor employees are moved ahead in the line. Calling the efficiency
properties of security into question, that is, will and should influence the balancing process usually invoked to solve bankruptcy
distribution questions. Indeed, ignorance regarding the true
properties of security may underlie the Bankruptcy Code's relatively unfavorable treatment of the secured creditor, which is done
to increase the likelihood that insolvent firms will reorganize; and
reorganizations are thought to be desirable largely because they
save jobs and sometimes salvage something for small equity investors. That ignorance respecting security can have such policy consequences makes research into its actual nature an important matter, both for those to whom recent bankruptcy distributional
trends are desirable and for those to whom these trends are
undesirable.

